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NORDIC NATO IN 
TRANSITION
Toward Turbulence 
in the 1990s ?
Lt Co l  Lawrence R. N ilssen USAF
AS recently as 4 August 1987 the Washington Post published an ar tide titled All s Quiet on the Nor wegian Soviet Frontier 1 The 
thesis of the article was that despite a huge 
concentration of Soviet forces in close prox 
ïmitytoNATO tensions were low as usual 
This view has been the conventional wis­
dom since World War II Past journalists 
have habituallv called the northern prov 
mees of Norway Sweden and Finland NA 
TO s quiet corner or the forgotten flank 
when they addressed the area at all This is 
changing Since the early 1980s several 
trends have emerged that guarantee in­
creased attention to the Scandinavian arctic 
area The trends have recently been accel 
erated by unrelated events and develop 
ments and as a result the area is now 
emerging in the forefront of international 
J efense policy debate as suggested by So 
fciet General Secretary Gorbachev s recent 
" propaganda peace offensive 2 This 
e identifies these trends shows why 
sr levels of confrontation and conflict 
kely in the future and suggests some
modest measures that will maintain the
quiet corner status quo even as the air 
space over the arctic north and particularly 
over northern Norway becomes ever more 
critical to Soviet military interests
The central military reality driving all 
other considerations in the arctic north is 
the concentration there of roughly two 
thirds of the modern Soviet nuclear sub 
marine (SSBN) fleet including the Typhoon 
SSBNs 3 Five of these huge submarines have 
been launched and they operate out of the 
Murmansk area 4 We cannot predict the So 
viet tactical doctrine of combat employ 
ment with 100 percent certainty but the US 
Navy believes the SSBNs will be dispersed 
into a heavily defended bastion in the 
Barents Sea and under the arctic ice pack 
where they will represent the most surviv 
able component of a Soviet second strike 
capability 5
Discernible Soviet doctrine places high 
value on the correlation of nuclear forces 
during the unfolding of any possible con 
flict As the fixed silos of the Soviet land 
based ICBMs become increasingly threat 
ened by future deployments of accurate 
Peacekeeper cruise and D5 missiles the 
Soviets will no doubt place an even higher 
premium on their SLBM assets Even the 
proposed Strategic Defensive Initiative if 
effective will enhance the strategic value of 
submarine missile forces by placing a pre 
mium on submarine launched cruise mis 
siles and depressed trajectory SLBMs As
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the relative value of these second strike as 
sets appreciates the pressure on the Soviets 
to take whatever measures are necessarv to 
assure their survival will increase Bv di 
rectlv threatening Soviet second strike as 
sets the recently developed M aritime 
Strategv of the US Navy could also contrib 
ute to instability
A comprehensive discussion of the Mari 
time Strategy is beyond the scope of this pa 
per and volumes have been written but 
some fundamentals are immediatelv rele 
vant to the Scandinavian arctic The Man 
time Strategy would send several powerful 
carrier battle groups and perhaps one battle 
ship group north cautiouslv and prudently 
but aggressively to engage the Soviet naval 
forces in their home waters and threaten the 
SSBNs in their bastion 6 This strategy 
promulgated during Secretarv of the Navy 
John Lehman s articulate stewardship rep 
resents a revolutionary change from the Na 
vy s previous role of sea control—defending 
the sea lines of communication Should the 
Navv be called to execute the strategy the 
Soviets must attempt to establish control of 
the arctic airspaces for both offensive and 
defensive missions If in the ensuing fight 
our naval forces are significant^ degraded 
then their more traditional mission of sea 
control may fail and the resupplv of Europe 
mav be impossible If the resupplv of Eu 
rope fails the alternatives for Western Eu 
rope mav well be surrender or nuclear 
escalation Thus the Maritime Strategy 
puts a premium on control of the arctic air 
spaces for both .  des at the instant hostili 
ties seem probable
A major consideration for both Amen 
cans and Norwegians is how to exercise the 
Maritime Strategy during peacetime The 
Norwegians recognize that the strategy is a 
mixed blessing They cautiouslv welcome it 
as a logical displav of NATO resolve to de 
fend Norwav but fully recognize both the 
Soviet sensitivities and the difficulty of op 
erating large formations of major surface 
combatants in the northern seas which are 
among the worlds most environmentally 
difficult waters Senior Norwegian defense
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officials want more exercises of larger scope 
in the north for six reasons to gain profi 
ciencv in the arctic environment to dem 
onstrate NATO resolve and solidantv to 
balance increased Soviet activitv to ob 
serve Soviet activity to exercise the right to 
free transit and to routinize American car 
ner groups operating in arctic waters 8 His 
toncallv  the Soviets have been verv 
sensitive to foreign forces in proximity to 
their vital interests The Soviets invaded 
Finland in 1939 to take Leningrad out of ar 
tillerv range of the Finnish border for ex 
ample One must wonder how the Soviets 
would react if an unrelated crisis developed 
while an offensive battle group was exercis 
ing near the Kola peninsula 
Our battle groups are improving their of 
fensive strike capabilities A recent article 
in the New York Times disclosed that the 
United States had developed a terminallv 
guided cruise missile that could hit within 
inches of the desired aim point therewith 
blurring the distinction between nuclear 
and conventional weapons 9 This cruise 
missile could be launched from a subma 
rme could have stealth characteristics 
and would be available sometime in the 
mid 1990s A follow up article reported 
that the newest Los Angeles class attack 
submarines will carrv 10 vertical cruise 
missile launchers and that the newest Sea 
w olf class attack submarines will carrv 50 
such weapons 10 These systems have pro 
fcund military implications as thev theo 
reticallv allow a disabling (or at least 
degrading) surprise attack against the Kola 
mihtarv defenses without using nuclear 
munitions With defenses disabled Soviet 
mihtarv facilities would be vulnerable to 
systematic destruction by less vulnerable 
carrier battle group conventional forces US 
submarines could carrv out the attack mis 
sion while hunting for Soviet SSBNs and 
could switch munition pavloads from con 
ventional to nuclear without warning After 
these weapons are operational defense in 
depth will be critical The Soviets must en 
sure as far as they can that these triple 
threat submarine launching platforms are
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kept as far away as possible and that thev 
are destroyed as quickly as possible at the 
outbreak of hostilities Large volumes of air 
space must be available to allow time to de 
tect and intercept incoming cruise missiles 
and aircraft Northern Norway offers a large 
volume of (relatively) lightly defended air 
space adjacent to Norwegian coastal areas 
where US submarine launching platforms 
could be concealed Also the mere exis 
tence of submarine launching platforms in 
near proximity to Soviet waters could pre 
cipitate a crisis where none had previously 
existed especially if the Soviets conclude 
that submarine strength had been purposely 
massed to the level that permits a high prob 
ability of a successful disarming strike
The relative decline of the air forces of 
Sweden and Finland is another trend in the 
arctic that is working against NATO The 
Finnish air force limited by treaty to only 
60 aircraft 11 has always been weak com 
pared to the air forces of the surrounding 
power blocs Not so the Swedish air force 
The defense spokesman for the Swedish 
Conservative Party Carl Bildt has indi 
cated that the two most important ingredi 
ents of the Nordic m ilitary strategic 
equation are the Keflavik Air Base in Ice 
land and the Royal Sw edish Air Force 
(RSAF) 12 Once nearly the equal of USAFE 
in surge strength the RSAF guaranteed 
unacceptably high attrition rates to anv ag 
gressive penetrator and contributed to the 
stability of the area This is rapidly 
changing
Post Vietnam antimihtansm in Sweden 
coupled with the American Soviet detente 
in the early 1970s was used by the ruling 
Swedish Social Democratic party as a justi 
fication to allow military budgets to lan 
guish While NATO and Warsaw Pact forces 
were deploying both more and more capa 
ble aircraft the RSAF while deploying 
more capable aircraft was deploying far 
fewer of them down from 56 squadrons in 
962 to 27 5 squadron equivalents of all 
types in 1987 13 This decline of strength 
might have been appropriate had detente 
flourished but with the advent of the Soviet
buildup and the Reagan administration s re 
ply the relative strengths of the Swedish 
and constrained Finnish air forces have de 
tenorated markedly since the earlv 1980s 
According to Rovai Swedish \ir Force fig 
ures the air forces that can be employed 
against Sweden have increased 25 percent 
relative to RSAF strength between 1974 and 
1987 and threaten to increase to over 40 
percent by 1992 14 The relative decline of 
the RSAF has led to a Swedish defense de
The Soviets huge  Tvphoon class submarines based  at 
Murmansk repres nt an  important and lucrative tar 
get in the Navv s m aritim e strategy therebv increasing  
the tensions  in NATO s Nordic flank
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bate that is more controversial and public 
than usual
In February 1987 the Swedish air force 
chief of staff published an article that ex 
amined the relationship of force quality to 
quantity and how greatly the lack of aircraft 
numbers would influence combat effective 
ness 15 The article was remarkably detailed 
open and candid Of interest to northern 
stability the study examined three scena 
nos (1) sustained m ilitary operations
through Swedish airspace (2) a surprise 
massed attack through Swedish airspace 
and (3) RSAF capabilities against cruise 
missiles
For sustained operations the author as 
sumed that an aggressor would attempt to 
operate between 200 and 600 aircraft 
through Swedish airspace around the clock 
to attack targets outside Sweden The au 
thor assumed that the ability to destroy 50 
percent of any overflying force within 10
The f 35 Draken aircraft (above) has been in the inventoiy for some time in 
eluding a squadron that was recently reactivated after having been in storage 
Some estimates predict that only two more squadrons of fighter aircraft would 
increase the effectiveness of the Royal Swedish Air Force by as much as 40 per 
cent helping the Swedes to intercept aircraft attempting to penetrate Swedish 
airspace such as this Tu 16 Badger (right)
days using a combination of Swedish and 
target area defenses would deter sustained 
overflight in a conventional scenario To ac 
complish this the chief of staff wrote that 
RSAF would have to destroy 2 5 to 5 per 
cent of the entire overflying force (five to 30 
aircraft) daily The article concluded that if 
the Swedes had a great deal going for them 
(good weather early warning intact 
ground controlled intercept and no major 
enemy efforts against Sw edish air and 
ground assets) the existing Swedish air 
force was sufficient Finally it also con 
eluded that the existing quality was good 
but that the existing quantity was border 
line in many cases to deter sustained op 
erations through Swedish airspace 16 The 
results were less sanguine for scenarios in 
volvmg surprise massed attack transiting 
Swedish airspace or cruise missiles
To deter a surprise massed attack through 
Swedish airspace the article assumed that 
the RSAF would have to destroy about 10 
percent of the transiting aircraft It assumed 
a massed attack would involve 200 to 400 
aircraft but could be more Since RSAF 
would have to defend the airspace of a 
country about the size and shape of Califor 
ma with 11 squadrons its assets would be 
spread thm giving the aggressors the ad 
vantage of localized mass The study con 
eluded that in such an environment the 
aggressors could possibly inflict heavy 
losses on the locally outnumbered RSAF 17 
Against cruise m issile overflight the 
Swedes acknowledged that merely detect 
ing the missile let alone destroying it was 
extremely difficult at present A recurring 
conclusion in all scenarios was that the 
quantity of aircraft is not sufficient to deal
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with anything except optimum scenarios 
The author even applied Lanchester s theo 
rem to show that just one additional squad 
ron would raise the marginal effectiveness 
of the RSAF by 20 percent and two addi 
tional squadrons by 40 percent18 
Publication of that article was followed 
by further public disagreement among the 
senior military staff 19 Finally the RSAF 
commander in chief (no doubt familiar with 
Lanchester s theorem) let it be known that 
Jie would augment his forces by a minimal 
squadron (12 aircraft) of refurbished J 35J 
Draken interceptors taken out of storage 
even if he had to pay the costs out of his 
hide from the other parts of his already m 
adequate budg et20 This unprecedented de
Frederick W Lanchester s mutual attrition equations are 
mathematical models commonly used by war planners to pre 
diet the impact on combat effectiveness caused by incremental 
changes in quantity and quality of opposing forces
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cisión shows how concerned the Swedish 
air force commander m chief is about the 
lack of aircraft Due to fiscal constraints 
augmenting the aircraft numbers must oc 
cur at the expense of other force enhancers 
such as an upgraded C3I system improved 
dispersed ground facilities and so forth 
and unfortunately the fiscal constraints oc 
cur at a time of increased Soviet military ac 
tivity in the area
The Soviets have a tradition of military 
heavy handedness and intim idation in 
their relations with Sweden and to a lesser 
extent with Norway (interestingly very lit 
tie of late against Finland with whom the 
Soviets have encouraged a special rela 
tionship ) Recently the Soviets have been 
conducting extensive operations against 
Sweden both underwater and on land The 
reasons for this campaign are open to spec 
ulation since the Soviets do not explain 
their motives but several very plausible 
conclusions may be drawn conclusions 
that all support the thesis that the Soviets 
are systematically and methodically doing 
their homework should they judge it nec 
essary to launch a surprise offensive in the 
north The military objective in Sweden 
could be to degrade and delay Swedish mo 
bihzation during the first critical hours of an 
offensive against northern Norway thereby 
lowering Soviet costs to an acceptable level 
Other Warsaw Pact members assist the 
Soviets with their homework Warsaw 
Pact commercial vehicles have been seen in 
the most extraordinarily noncommercial 
areas photographing facilities intercepting 
transmissions and so forth 21 During the 
summer of 1987 when virtually all Swedes 
by custom vacationed in the countryside a 
number of vacationing high ranking mili 
tary officers felt that their locations and 
movements were being followed by foreign 
agents 22 On 27 December 1983 a single elec 
trical transformer in central Sweden went 
out A chain reaction followed blacking out 
central Sweden and parts of Denmark and 
Norway Significant portions of the emer 
gency broadcast system which controls 
mobilization failed 23 One isolated exam
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pie true but the event suggests that a very 
small but highly planned attack could sig 
nificantly degrade the Swedish mobiliza 
tion timetable
Operating submarines in Swedish terri­
torial waters is a major Soviet assignment 
with several immediate military rewards
• The Soviets update their knowledge of 
the Swedish defenses as well as of changing 
bottom characteristics (this knowledge 
could prove invaluable should the Soviets 
want to conceal submarines in the vast 
20 000 plus island Swedish archipelago)
• The Soviet crews get the best possible 
combat like experience (the charges 
dropped by the Swedes are very real but not 
lethal and the Swedish ASW capability is 
excellent but very thin)
• Finally the Soviets can simulate in 
serting Spetsnaz saboteurs and assassins 
who in the event of conflict would attack 
key communications nodes and power grid 
pressure points (such as the previously 
mentioned transformer) and assassinate key 
mobilization decisionmakers both military 
and civilian To facilitate submarine activi 
ties the Soviets would like to see all littoral 
states accept routimzation of Soviet sub 
marine operations within their territorial 
waters To degrade defenses in northern 
Sweden and facilitate access to northern 
Norway the Soviets would like this routin 
ization of submarine activities to extend to 
the Gulf of Bothnia between Sweden and 
Finland
The Gulf of Bothnia long an area of low 
military activity has seen extensive opera 
tions of what must be Soviet submarines in 
recent years 24 This must be at least partly 
construed as preparation for military oper 
ations against the northernmost areas of 
Sweden and also of Norway and Finland 
There are also signs that routimzation of op 
erations has occurred The Swedish navy 
has enlisted the assistance of the Swedish 
civ ilian s who vacation heavily in the 
coastal areas to try to detect submarine ac 
tivity visually According to one recent re
port hunting U boats has become a popular 
seaside pastime 25 The Soviets are also ac 
tive m the northern airspace but here they 
use intim idation as a tactic instead of 
stealth that intimidation has led to armed 
confrontation and could precipitate its own 
crisis m the future
The Soviets have a long history of play 
mg hardball in the sensitive airspace over 
the Baltic and Barents seas In the past they 
have shot down aircraft in international air 
space without warning 26 In the recent past 
an Su 15—of KAL 007 notoriety—took up a 
firing position on a chartered civilian jet full 
of vacationers and actually followed it in a 
firing position into Swedish airspace 27 In 
Septem ber 1987 the Soviets harassed a 
Swedish electronic intelligence collection 
aircraft resulting in a near collision 28 A 
Norwegian P 3 Orion was not so fortunate 
it was actually hit by an overly aggressive 
MiG pilot m the same month 29 For people 
who live in the small countries near the 
northern USSR this is all judged as normal 
(routmized) consistent Soviet behavior Re 
cent Scandinavian history offers several ex 
amples of the decisive military advantage 
accruing to surprise attack
In Scandinavia the most memorable 
precedent of Soviet willingness to use mil 
itary force to gain space for defense in depth 
was the surprise attack against Finland in
1939 Ignoring world opinion the Soviets 
began military operations to gain territory 
around Leningrad perceived as vital for 
defense against Nazi Germany The Norwe 
gians also suffered a surprise attack by Ger 
man airborne and air force units on 9 April
1940 By seizing mobilization depots and 
airfields the Germans prevented a Norwe 
gian mobilization and gained the strategic 
Norwegian coast from which to conduct U 
boat operations against the Allies Today 
the Norwegians have a term for behavior 
caused by lingering strong memories of the 
invasion/occupation T he A pril 9 syn  
drom e The Norwegians will not lightly suf 
fer surprise again Neither will the Soviets 
who were hurt badly by the surprise 
achieved by German forces during the open
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mg phase of the Great Patriotic War (World 
War II) That the cost of being surprised is 
disproportionately high was a lesson 
learned at a heavy cost of Soviet lives That 
the Soviet leadership has learned the lesson 
well has been demonstrated by their skillful 
use of surprise in the invasions of Hungary 
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan
Future stability m the extreme north de 
pends upon several factors First the West 
must be sensitive to the ramifications of the 
purely geographical accident that has 
forced the Soviets to station the bulk of their 
survivable second strike forces m the Mur 
mansk area The force is concentrated and 
represents both a lucrative target for NATO 
and a sensitive vulnerability to the Soviets 
Any threat perceived by the Soviets as di 
rect and imminent may be met with an ir 
ra tio n a l (from  a NATO v iew p o in t) 
response The Norwegians have demon 
strated a mastery of the art of distilling le­
gitim ate Soviet security concerns from 
volumes of propaganda and rhetoric They 
have refused to allow F I l l s  to exercise 
with NATO forces on Norwegian soil partly
out of deference to Soviet sensitivities 30 
They did not allow the US Marine Corps to 
preposition reinforcement equipment m the 
northernmost Norwegian provinces again 
partly out of deference to Soviet sensitivi 
ties The Norwegians understand that a mil 
itary posture balanced between activity and 
restraint m the arctic area is important to 
stability 31 Lack of an immediate offensive 
threat removes the destabilizing Soviet in 
centive for an immediate preemption 
In the realm of immediate threat US na 
val earner groups are a powerful force and 
they may be well advised to restrict exer 
cises m the Norwegian and Barents seas to 
the extent necessary to realize the six goals 
previously cited 32 The problem is that if a 
crisis should occur for whatever unrelated 
reason the presence of a carrier task force in 
a sensitive area could precipitate its own 
more immediate military crisis 
To make overflight of Swedish and Fin 
nish airspace as costly as possible the air 
forces of Finland and Sweden must be as 
strong as possible The United States and 
NATO can help Both air forces need tech
THE NORDIC BALANCE
The Nordic Balance is a model useful for explaining relationships between Scandinavian 
countries and between the Scandinavian bloc and the superpowers since World War II The 
relationships are formalized by treaty alliance policy culture and tradition and allow all 
players a certain latitude of action
The NATO presence in Norway has been made less threatening to the vital Soviet Kola 
military installations by a deliberate Norwegian policy of restraint (Some examples no nu 
clear weapons in Norway no foreign troops based m Norway and severe restrictions on 
military exercises near the sensitive border ) The Soviets gain defensive security from the 
inoffensive buffer provided by nonaligned Swedish and neutral Finnish territories the lat 
ter loosely bound by treaty to consultations should tensions become extreme 
In the ludgment of Johan Jorgen Holst the Norwegian minister of defense the Soviets have 
historically shown restraint in the strength of standing ground forces and offensive air 
power on the Kola peninsula given the vital nature of the assets in place The operative re 
suit is an equilibrium with disincentives for escalation of forces targeted at the immediate 
area the bottom line is predictability and stability 
This historically happy state of affairs has been overtaken by trends and events both 
within the Nordic Balance context and external to its mechanisms Incremental measured 
responses are in danger of being overwhelmed by the decisive advantages accrued by the 
preemptive surprise attack or more precisely by the intolerable penalties of being the first 
to absorb a surprise attack Minister Holst also points out that while Soviet standing forces 
in the area are relatively small they are rapidly being improved and could also be rapidly 
reinforced
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nologicallv modem airplanes Both forces 
need technologically modem missile sys 
terns such as the latest Hawk AIM 9 and 
AMRAAM systems as they become avail 
able (and are requested) Both need effective 
force multipliers such as airborne early 
warning and control (AWAC) systems (The 
Swedish air force is in fact developing the 
prototype of a hi tech cheap but effective 
AWACS )33 Both countries recognize that 
while thev must maintain neutral non 
threatening postures toward the Soviets 
their cultures and living standards are inex 
tncably Western So there are powerful mo 
t ivators  in place  to ensure  wi thin  
reasonable risk that both countries will re 
speet the advantages that access to Western 
technology gives them Finally both coun 
tries must be given the latitude to maneuver 
within the Nordic Balance (see box pre 
vious page)
This article has examined the trends and 
development that are changing NATO s 
Scandinavian flank The Soviet SSBN de 
ployments the US Navy s Maritime Strai 
egv the de pl oyme nt  of submar ine  
launched precision cruise missiles the rei 
ative weakening of the Swedish and Fin 
nish air forces the confrontational So\ íet 
behavior and a heritage of surprise militan 
operations guarantee that the area will not 
remain the forgotten flank in the future 
The collective NATO challenge will be to 
keep the area from being involved in a 
costlv arms race of the type that has oc 
curred in the European central front and to 
avoid actions that will accelerate further 
destabilization while continuing to under 
write credible collective forces capable ot 
deterr ing anv m i sc a l c u l a t e d  Soviet  
adventure □
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